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Epistemic Democracy and Its Critics  
[Pre-Publication Version ± for authoritative version, check the published issue: 
http://www.criticalreview.com/crf/index.html] 
 
 Daniel Viehoff: Welcome everybody. Thank you for turning up at this uncivilized hour. 
Let me very briefly introduce the panelists: Nadia Urbinati of Columbia University, Hélène 
Landemore of Yale University, Jack Knight of Duke University, and I am Daniel Viehoff of the 
University of Sheffield. The decision we came to, in more or less democratic fashion, was that 
each of us would speak for about 12-PLQXWHVDQGWKHQZH¶GRSHQLWXSIRUTXHVWLRQVEHFDXVH
we are all as interested in what you have to say as in what we have to say. And, for lack of any 
RWKHUDUUDQJHPHQW,WKLQNZH¶OOMXVWJRLQDOSKDEHWLFDORUGHU 
 
 Jack Knight: When I was asked to participate in this discussion about epistemic 
democracy and then told that I had to keep it to 10-PLQXWHV,WKRXJKW,¶Ye never kept 
anything to 10-PLQXWHVEXW,ZLOOWU\,¶OOWU\WRGRHYHQEHWWHUWKDQWKDW,ZDVWU\LQJWRUHIOHFW
upon these debates and a number of questions that emerged, it seems to me, are subject to 
disagreement. So what I wanted to do, to start my part of the discussion, was to focus on three of 
WKRVHDQGWU\WRVD\ZKDW¶VDWVWDNHLQWKHGHEDWHZKDWGLIIHUHQFHGRHVLWPDNHZKDWWKHDQVZHUV
to particular questions are.  
So the first question is, what are the actual effects that are attributed to democratic 
institutions in the epistemic democracy literature? What are the outcomes in the democratic 
decision-making process? This is a question that emerges from the advocates of epistemic 
GHPRFUDF\7KHRWKHUWZRTXHVWLRQVWKDW,¶PJRLQJWRUDLVHHPHUJH more from the critics of 
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epistemic democracy. The second question is, What are the conditions necessary for democratic 
institutions to actually produce these effects that are attributed to them? Do democratic 
institutions actually do what epistemic democrats say that they do? And the third question is, 
Why should we give these effects any normative weight or significance?   
Let me briefly make some comments about each of the three, then. The first is, What are 
the actual effects on democratic decisions? There are an ever-increasing range of claims that are 
made by people who would fall into the category of epistemic democrats. The first, the one that 
is most traditional, is that democracy under the right kind of conditions can produce true 
answers, the truth in some kind of sense. And that the collective deliberative process arrives at 
the truth somehow. That might mean a number of different things, but it could mean that it 
FRPHVWRWKHWUXWKDERXWDIDFWRIWKHPDWWHUWKDW¶VUHOHYDQWWRSXEOLFSROLF\RULt could be the 
WUXWKDERXWDMXGJPHQWDERXWZKDWLVWKHFRPPRQJRRG6RWKDW¶VRQHFDWHJRU\RIFODLPVRI
DFWXDOHIIHFWVWKDWLWFDQSURGXFHWUXWKVRPHKRZ7KHUH¶VDJURZLQJJURXSRISHRSOHZKR
SUREDEO\WKLQNWKDWJHWWLQJDW³WKHWUXWK´LVWRRVWURQJDFODim to make for democratic institutions, 
but who do think that democracy has epistemic value in producing better decisions. Here the 
³EHWWHUGHFLVLRQV´ZRXOGPHDQWKHHQKDQFHPHQWRIGHPRFUDWLFGHFLVLRQVWKURXJKGLVFXVVLRQ 
$QGWKLVLVZKHUH,¶YHHQWHUHGLQto the discussion with my co-author Jim Johnson in a 
book we wrote a few years ago called The Priority of Democracy [Knight and Johnson 2011], 
where we looked at three democratic mechanisms and asked, what do they actually do, and what 
are the effects they can have? The three mechanisms were voting, argument, and reflexivity. To 
JLYH\RXDQH[DPSOHRIWKHQRWLRQRIWKH³EHWWHU´ZHWRRNRQWKHFKDOOHQJHRIVRFLDO-choice 
theory, which makes several claims about how voting undermines the legitimacy of the 
democratic process. Looking at a lot of research on discourse in a democratic setting, we tried to 
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try to make a claim that, in fact, an argument can have a positive epistemic effect in terms of 
SHRSOH¶VNQRZOHGJHDERXWSUHIHUHQFHV²,FDQ¶WJRLQWRLWQRZ²but that was an argument that 
tried to suggest that the social-choice picture of democracy not being legitimate for various sorts 
of reasons really can be diminished through argument, that argument has legitimizing effects.  
Now the one point I want to make about this in terms of truth²,¶PDSUDJPDWLVWVRWUXWK
maybe means something different for me than for many other people²but truth is a standard that 
LI\RXVDLGWKDW¶VZKDWZH¶UHWU\LQJWRDFKLHYHPD\EHSHRSOHZLOOXQGHUVWDQG,I\RXWDONDERXW
³EHWWHU´ LW¶VDPRUHVOLSSHU\FULWHULRQEHWWHUWKDQwhat? So if the epistemic democrats are going 
WRXVHWKHFULWHULRQRI³EHWWHU´²democratic institutions are going to make decision making better 
in certain kinds of ways²WKH\¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHWRFDVKRXWWKDWQRWLRQRI³EHWWHU´DQGRQZKDW
GLPHQVLRQ,WKLQNWKDW¶VRQHRIWKHUHDVRQVZK\PDQ\RIWKHHDUO\SUDJPDWLVWVOLNH'HZH\DQG
Pierce were attracted to evolutionary theory, which provided them with a standard they can use 
in terms of thinking about that particular issue.  
Now as I suggested, the critics have raised a number of questions about this type of 
argument. And I just want to briefly, through those other two questions I suggested, highlight 
two of the critical claims. One claim is that there is really no empirical basis for believing the 
epistemic claims that democracy can improve democratic decision making. And the second is 
WKDWHYHQLILWZHUHWUXHWKDWWKH\KDYHWKHVHHIIHFWVWKHUH¶VQRUHDVRQWRJLYHWKHPDQ\QRUPDWLYH
weight. So those are two, of how I would see, some of the criticisms.  
Jim and I in our book spend a lot of time talking about the conditions necessary for 
democratic institutions to improve decision making. We talked about it in terms of institutional 
effectiveness: when might that haSSHQ"%HFDXVHLW¶VQRWWKHFDVHWKDWXQGHUDQ\W\SHRIFRQGLWLRQ
you can have these epistemic effects. Now I actually think this is a weak link in the epistemic 
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OLWHUDWXUHWKHUH¶VLQVXIILFLHQWDWWHQWLRQWRWKLVTXHVWLRQRIZKDWDUHWKHFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKich 
these things would actually happen. And I would encourage people who pursue this line of 
argument to be clear about those conditions. Because I think there is empirical evidence to 
suggest that democratic institutions have positive epistemic effects in some cases. Now it might 
make a difference if you believe that the epistemic benefit is truth, as opposed to if you think that 
WKHHSLVWHPLFEHQHILWLVEHWWHUGHFLVLRQV,QWHUPVRIWUXWKLW¶VJRLQJWREHVRPHZKDWKDUGHUWR
make the case because the quesWLRQEHFRPHV:KDW¶VWKHFULWHULRQRIWUXWKWKDW\RX¶UHXVLQJDVD
way of assessing the institutions in any particular context? If you have some sort of objective 
notion of truth and the idea is that citizens are trying to figure out where it can be found, LW¶V
going to be hard to sustain the claim that democracy will guide them there, it seems to me. If you 
have rather a more pragmatic conception of truth, as sort of a convergence of beliefs over time, 
then it might be more possible to address this type of question in some kind of systematic way.  
Just briefly, I want to say that one of the important things we try to address in our book 
RQWKHVXEMHFWRI³FRQGLWLRQV´UHDOO\JRHVWRRQHRIWKHFKDOOHQJHVWKDWWKHGHVFULSWLRQRIWKLV
roundtable raises, which is the issue about power. Some of the critiques of epistemic democrats 
ask whether if democracy is really just about conflict and power, why are you talking about 
epistemic qualities? And under some conditions that would be a very good challenge. What we 
try to argue in our book is that there are conditions that diminish asymmetries of power, then you 
can make a serious claim that epistemic benefits can take place. So I think there is an argument 
there that can be addressed against those types of critics thDWVXJJHVWWKHUH¶VQRHPSLULFDOEDVLV
for the epistemic benefits in a certain kind of way. 
But so what? So what if democratic institutions do have epistemic benefits, why should 
we give them any normative weight in terms of our justification for democracy? ,WKLQNWKDW¶V
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really at the heart of many of these debates. The challenge comes from those people who think 
democracy is better justified by some sort of intrinsic quality. 
$FRXSOHRIWKLQJVWRVD\DERXWWKDWDQGWKHQ,SURPLVH,¶OOVWRS$GYRFDWHVRIHpistemic 
justification somehow have to rest their normative claims to a certain extent, at least²and I think 
to a great extent²on the consequences of the democratic process. Now this in itself is a 
debatable point, because some would want to make the claim that the epistemic argument is a 
SURFHGXUDODUJXPHQWRWKHUVZDQWWRPDNHWKHFODLPWKDWLW¶VVRUWRIDFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDUJXPHQW
$VDSUDJPDWLVW,IDOORQWKHVLGHWKDWLW¶VDFRQVHTXHQWLDOLVWDUJXPHQWDQG,WKLQNWRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWWKHUH¶VDQ\QRUPDWLve weight that should be given to the epistemic benefits of democracy, it 
has to come from the improvement in the consequences of the democratic process brought about 
E\LWVHSLVWHPLFSURSHUWLHV,IUDWKHU\RXGRQ¶WZDQWWRIRFXVRQWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVWKHn I think it 
becomes more complicated.  
One last point I want to make about these debates. Many of these debates about 
justifications of democracy seem to become beside the point in the sense that if you value 
equality most and if you think that the best way to justify democracy is through the claim about 
KRZLWLQVWDQWLDWHVHTXDOLW\WKHQWKHUH¶VQRWKLQJWKDWWKHHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDWVDUHJRLQJWRVD\WR
\RXWKDW¶VJRLQJWRSHUVXDGH\RXRWKHUZLVHLQDFHUWDLQVHQVH,IRQWKHRWKHUKDQG\RXYDOXH
the consHTXHQFHVPRVWWKHUH¶VYHU\OLWWOHFKDQFHWKDWDFODLPDERXWHTXDOLW\SHUVHLVJRLQJWR
persuade you to change your position. So a lot of these debates seem to be working on separate 
WUDFNVZLWKRXWHQJDJLQJVLQFHLW¶VKDUGWRILJXUHRXWH[DFWO\ZKHUHWKe engagement would take 
place. If you believe²,¶OOHQGRQWKLV²that there are correct answers to these questions about 
what the best justification for democracy is, then I think the burden is on you to suggest what the 
criterion would be that would allow us to assess the relative correctness of the different 
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DUJXPHQWV,I\RX¶UHOLNHPHDQG\RX¶UHDSUDJPDWLVWDQGWKLQNLW¶VPRUHDERXWWKHFRQVHTXHQFHV
then we think that the value debate is an irresolvable one and so we focus on the other aspects 
WKDW,¶YH mentioned. 
 
 Hélène Landemore,WLWOHGP\OLWWOHLQWHUYHQWLRQ³:KR¶V$IUDLGRI(SLVWHPLF
'HPRFUDF\"´,ZDQWWRWDNHWKLVRSSRUWXQLW\WRVD\DIHZZRUGVWKLVPRUQLQJDERXWZKDW,WDNH
epistemic democracy to mean, and to complement what Jack explained about why it scares 
people²wrongly, in my view.  
 Epistemic democracy is not an easy sell. Just the name itself is not clear to a lot of 
SHRSOHDQG\HW,WKLQNLW¶VDSDLULQJRIWZRYHU\VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGWHUPVWKHPDLQIHDWXUHRIZKLFK
is to emphasize the knowledge-producing properties of democratic institutions and procedures; 
and specifically, as Jack already said, to assume that those procedures are good at tracking a 
procedure-LQGHSHQGHQWVWDQGDUGRIFRUUHFWQHVVZKLFKLVVRPHWLPHVFDOOHG³WUXWK´ 
 The fRUPXODWLRQRIWKDWFRQFHSWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR-RVKXD&RKHQ¶V
VHPLQDODUWLFOHIURP³$Q(SLVWHPLF&RQFHSWLRQRI'HPRFUDF\´>&RKHQ@LQZKLFKKH
was basically providing an antinomy to the aggregate conception of democracy then dominant. 
He gives three features of an epistemic conception of democracy: voting is a cognitive activity, 
LW¶VQRWMXVWDQH[SUHVVLYHDFWLYLW\RIYRLFLQJ\RXUSUHIHUHQFHLWSUHVXSSRVHVDSURFHGXUH-
independent standard of correctness, something that your voter is trying to approach, in contrast 
to a view of democracy that says that the right outcome is whatever the procedure defines; and 
finally, and this is probably less relevant though I mention it anyway, it presupposes a Bayesian 
updating of your beliefs LQOLJKWRIQHZLQIRUPDWLRQVRLW¶VDFRJQLWLYHFRQFHSWLRQRIYRWLQJDQG
politics in general.  
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Epistemic democracy is meant to contrast, as I said, with so-called aggregative 
conceptions of democracy, by which I mean that democracy is just a method to aggregate 
individual preferences and turn them into a social choice. In that conception voting is just about 
DQH[SUHVVLRQRIXQUHDVRQHGSUHIHUHQFHVDQGZH¶UHQRWDLPLQJIRUDQ\WKLQJEH\RQGWKDW 
Because it opposes aggregative conceptions of democracy, epistemic democracy tends to 
be confused with deliberative democracy, but they are quite distinct. I would say that epistemic 
democracy is both a subset of deliberative democracy but also goes beyond it and includes things 
WKDWGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\GRHVQ¶WQecessarily include. So deliberative democrats were and still 
are in my view primarily interested in defining a source of legitimacy for democratic decisions, 
distinct from that proposed by aggregative democrats. For democratic decisions to be legitimate, 
dHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDWVDUJXHWKH\FDQ¶WVLPSO\EHWKHUHVXOWRIWKHDJJUHJDWLRQRISUHIHUHQFHV
let alone the bargaining of representatives. They have to be the outcome of a deliberative process 
characterized by certain features, like equality among the participants, respect, sincerity, fairness, 
and the exchange of public reasons. When the literature on deliberative democracy became more 
empirically oriented, other questions became of interest, such as, What are the procedural criteria 
of equal deliberatioQ"&DQWKH\EHPHDVXUHG"$QGWKHUH¶VDFRWWDJHLQGXVWU\LQWKHVWXGLHVWKDW
PHDVXUHWKHTXDOLW\RIGHOLEHUDWLRQDQGLW¶VEHFRPHDKXJHUHVHDUFKILHOG 
Epistemic democrats, by contrast, are interested in two other questions. One is normative; 
it has to do with the nature of democratic authority and democratic legitimacy and whether these 
should include an instrumental, specifically an epistemic, dimension. In other words, the 
question is whether the substantive nature and content of democratic outcomes should matter in 
HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHDXWKRULW\DQGOHJLWLPDF\RIVXFKGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHV7KDW¶VWKHTXHVWLRQ
most notoriously asked by David Estlund in a 1997 article and his 2008 book, Democratic 
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Authority [Estlund 1997 and 2008]. Another question which many epistemic democrats have 
EHHQH[SORULQJWKDW¶VPRUHDORQJWKHOLQHVRIZKDW-DFNZDVH[SODLQLQJLV'RZHKDYHUHDVRQVWR
believe that democratic institutions actually have any epistemic properties, that is, do they track 
the truth or produce good decisiRQVRYHUDOOLQVRPHVHQVH"7KDW¶VZKHUHP\ZRUNDQG-DFN¶V
ZRUNRYHUODSV,ZRXOGVD\:H¶UHFRQFHUQHGPRUHZLWKWKHGHVFULSWLYHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU
democracies do have these properties or not. Among the people I probably should mention are 
Robert Goodin, ZKRDFWXDOO\ZDVVFKHGXOHGWREHKHUHEXWFRXOGQ¶WPDNHLWIURP$XVWUDOLD
[*ÅH: Which work by Goodin should we cite?²J] There is also Josh Ober at Stanford who 
developed a case study of the epistemic properties of Athens, a specific version of democracy 
[Ober 2010]. The later Habermas as well has been described as going through an epistemic turn, 
so he would qualify as an epistemic democrat [Habermas 1996?*]. But in any case, one virtue of 
WKDWDSSURDFKDPRQJPDQ\LVWKDWLW¶VFRQGXFLYHWRDUHFRQFLOLDWion between theoretical, 
normative research and empirical approaches: it allows for a dialogue between normative and 
empirical theories. On that front, a fruitful shared investigation for normative and empirical 
theorists alike is the following question: how should we conceptualize the truth, goodness, 
correctness of democratic decisions or solutions in epistemic democratic theories? There are 
many possibilities: you can conceptualize it in terms of good governance, human rights, social 
justice, perhaps a developmental index, a happiness index or something like that, or something 
else entirely. There are a lot of options. Assuming we can figure that conceptual puzzle out, then 
WKHUH¶VWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZGR\RXJRDERXWPHDVXULQJWKDWHPSLULFDOO\"7KHUH¶VYHry little done 
VRIDURQWKDWEXW,WKLQNLW¶VQHFHVVDU\WRKDYHILUVWTXHVWLRQHGWKDWDORXGDERXWPHDVXULQJILUVW
6R,WKLQNWKDW¶VZKHUHZHDUHLQWKHILHOGRIHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDF\ 
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 I should mention another question that I think is perhaps of interest more to philosophers, 
which is the rational stance of democratic citizens, if they are to assume that democratic 
institutions have epistemic properties. When you vote and deliberate should you update your 
beliefs based on the post-deliberative consensus of the group or the outcome of a majoritarian 
vote? For if, say, a referendum comesout a certain way, what does that say about your own belief 
if you find yourself in the minority? There a lot of puzzles like that that are explored in the field 
of social epLVWHPRORJ\WKDWKDYHQ¶WTXLWHPDGHWKHLUZD\LQWRWKHILHOGRISROLWLFDOVFLHQFHRU
SROLWLFDOWKHRU\7KDW¶VDVSDFHZKHUH,¶GOLNHWRVHHSROLWLFDOWKHRULVWVRFFXS\RUMRLQZLWKDOO
these other questions.  
 Now why is epistemic democracy problematic for some people? What do the critics say? 
-DFNDOUHDG\ODLGRXWVRPHRIWKHPDLQLVVXHVEXW,¶OOUHSKUDVHWKHPVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWO\SHUKDSV
One is that epistemic democrats judge democracy not by its intrinsic value but by its 
instrumental value, as well and in doing so they are said to threaten the intrinsic value of 
GHPRFUDF\E\PDNLQJLWOHVVDEVROXWH2QHZD\,¶YHWULHGWRXQGHUVWDQGWKLVLVE\VHHLQJWKH
FULWLFV¶SRLQWDVVD\LQJWKDWZH¶UHWU\LQJWRMXVWLI\WKH0RQD/LVDE\LWVPRQHWDU\YDOXHDQGWKDW¶V
thHZURQJDSSURDFK\RX¶UHDFWXDOO\FRUUXSWLQJWKHYDOXHRIWKDWZRUNE\DSSURDFKLQJLWWKDW
ZD\7KLVVRUWRIFULWLFLVPLVSDUWO\XQLQWHOOLJLEOHWRPH,GRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGZK\\RXFDQ¶WVD\
that something is both intrinsically valuable and instrumentally valuable as well. One precedent 
for that sort of approach is justice: doing the right thing for itself even while it may also be good 
IRU\RXLQWKHORQJWHUP<RXFDQKDYHWKRVHWZRWKRXJKWVDWWKHVDPHWLPH,MXVWGRQ¶WVHHWKH
contradiction here.  
 But it¶VSRVVLEOHWKDWZKDWZRUULHVVR-called proceduralists like Nadia, actually, is that 
epistemic democracy seems to question not just the intrinsic view of democracy but the very 
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principle of political equality underlying it, which I think is a different problem. Here, contrary 
WR-DFN,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHSURFHGXUDOLVWVKDYHDJRRGFDVHIRUOLQNLQJSROLWLFDOHTXDOLW\WR
democracy all the way in a neat, custom-WDLORUHGZD\$QGWKDW¶VEHFDXVHLWQHYHUDGGUHVVHVD
very good point made by David Estlund in his book, which is that if your only justification for 
GHPRFUDF\LVWKDWLWEHVWH[SUHVVHVSROLWLFDOHTXDOLW\WKHQZK\GRQ¶W\RXJRIRU³TXHHQIRUD
GD\´RUDIOLSRIWKHFRLQ"<RXKDYHSUHWW\PXFKWKHVDPHHTXDOLW\XQGHUWKRVHUXOHVDVXQGHU
democracy, especially mass democracy, where your vote counts for virtually nothing anyway. So 
LI\RXGRQ¶WKDYHDJRRGRUDQH[FOXVLYHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQSROLWLFDOHTXDOLW\DQGGHPRFUDF\
\RXQHHGDQDGGLWLRQDODUJXPHQWIRUGHPRFUDF\6RZK\GRQ¶W\RXZHOFRPHWKHHSLVWHPLF
democrats, who give it to you on a silver platter, who tell you, look, the reason you should go for 
democracy, majoritarian rule, isegoria, equal right of participating in an assembly, rather than 
these other forms of political equality, such as queen for a day or a flip of a coin is because when 
\RXJLYHSHRSOHDQHTXDOULJKWRIVSHHFKDQGDQHTXDOYRWH\RX¶OOJHWEHWWHUUHVXOWVXQGHUFHUWDLQ
FRQGLWLRQV6R,GRQ¶WWKLQNLW¶VWUXHWKDWHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDWVFDQQRWFRQYLQFHSURFHGXUDOLVWVWR
endorse their argument, since I think it adds to their case for democracy. 
 
 Knight,ZDVQ¶WWU\LQJWRVXJJHVWWKDWLWZDVQ¶WDSRVVLELOLW\,ZDVWU\LQJWRVXJJHVWWKDW
LW¶VQRWKDSSHQLQJ 
 
 Landemore,NQRZLW¶VQRWKDSSHQLQJEXW,GRQ¶WNQRZZK\LWFRXOGQ¶W,GRQ¶WVHHZK\
not.  
 
 Knight: OK. 
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 Landemore: Another question that critics raise is that by allowing for an epistemic 
comparison between democracies and autocracies, epistemic democrats risk making democracies 
look bad, less efficient, less truth-tracking than liberal autocracies than Singapore or China. Even 
Estlund seems to worry about that since he precludes the possibility entirely by invoking general 
acceptability requirements that would rule out autocracies²DVLIWRVD\³/RRN,¶PQRWHYHQ
JRLQJWKHUH´%XW,JRWKHUHDQG,GRQ¶WVHHZK\LW¶VDSUREOHP,WKLQNZHFDQVKRZSHRSOHOLNH
-DFN.QLJKWDQGP\VHOIWU\WRVKRZWKDWXQGHUWKHULJKWFRQGLWLRQV\RX¶UHEHWWHURIIXVLQJD
democratic method than a non-democratic one. It could be that under certain conditions you 
FRXOGEHEHWWHURIIZLWKDPRUHDXWRFUDWLFDSSURDFK%XWEHFDXVH-DFNDQG,GRQ¶WH[FOXGH
SURFHGXUDODUJXPHQWVWKDWPD\EHDWUDGHRII\RX¶GZDQWWRFRQVLGHUWKDWLQVRPHFases 
procedural arguments trump epistemic arguments and we need more work to show when and 
ZKHUHZH¶UHZLOOLQJWREDODQFHWKRVHFRPSOHPHQWDU\FRQVLGHUDWLRQV6R,ZRXOGQ¶WUXOHRXWWKH
TXHVWLRQMXVWEHFDXVHWKHUH¶VDULVNLQYROYHGWKDW¶VQRWDVFLHQWLILFapproach to anything. 
 $QRWKHUSUREOHPWKDW,¶YHVHHQFULWLFVUDLVHLVZLWKWKLVZKROHFRQFHSWRIWUXWKEHWWHU
outcome, or a procedure-independent standard of truth or correctness: people ask how would we 
NQRZZKDWVXFKDVWDQGDUGLV"$QGLIWKHUH¶VQRRWher way, then we need a democratic procedure 
WRDSSURDFKLWRUILJXUHLWRXWWRJHWDWLWDQGWKHQZH¶UHEDVLFDOO\EHJJLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ6RLI\RX
VD\ORRNWKHUH¶VJRWWREHDQRWKHUZD\WRPHHWWKDWVWDQGDUGWKHQLIWKHUHLVDQRWKHUVWDQGDUG
then why GRQ¶WZHXVHWKDWUDWKHUWKDQWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUH"7KDWFULWLTXH,WKLQNLVDYHU\
interesting one.  
0\DQVZHUDQG,¶PVWLOOZRUNLQJLWRXWLVWKDWZKHQLWFRPHVWRHPSLULFDOWUXWKV\RXMXVW
check out for yourself whether the solutions proposed by GHPRFUDWVDFWXDOO\ZRUNRUQRW7KDW¶V
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what the social sciences are about; it requires a complex analysis of the real world, and there are 
all sorts of problems making causal claims between certain decisions and certain outcomes and 
you have to think factuDOO\EXW,WKLQNLW¶VQRWLPSRVVLEOHWRWU\WRDVVHVVWKDW7KHZRUOGLVLQ
fact your test in a way, at least for the factual dimension of epistemic democracy. One problem is 
WKDWWKHUH¶VDWLPHGLPHQVLRQDVZHOO6RLQWKHKHUHDQGQRZ\RXFDQ¶WSURMHFWyourself four 
years from now and say, look, we chose the right president or that economic policy was the right. 
,QWKHKHUHDQGQRZDWWLPH7\RXGRQ¶WKDYHDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRDGHFLVLRQWKDWZRXOGHLWKHU
LQYROYHWKHIHZRUWKHPDQ\$OO,¶PVD\LQJLVWKDWDWWLPH7\RX¶OOOLNHO\EHWWHURIIZLWKWKH
decision that involves more people.  
For the normative, moral dimension, moral truth, it gets more complicated of course. For 
WKHDEROLWLRQRIVODYHU\\RXFDQ¶WMXVWVD\ZHOOLWZRUNVEHWWHU,QWHUPVRIKXPan happiness, 
clearly, it works better for all involved, but why should that be the criterion? But we can define 
GLIIHUHQWO\WKHFULWHULRQRIVXFFHVVKHUHPD\EHLW¶VWKHFRQYHUJHQFHWRZDUGVZKDWSHRSOHFDOO
³K\SHU-QRUPV´>Åcitation needed], that is, norms that are spreading among nations, like human 
rights, abolition of torture, or different forms of war practices. It gets very complicated, but I 
GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWFRPSOH[LW\VKRXOGEHDQREVWDFOHWRWU\LQJWRWKLQNDERXWWKHVHWKLQJV 
Finally the last question I see critics of epistemic democracy raise is that it is too 
idealistic. Even if we grant that there is a procedure-LQGHSHQGHQWVWDQGDUGRIFRUUHFWQHVVWKDW¶V
really a framework or conception that may be relevant to the type of politics that goes on in tiny 
Scandinavian villages, but surely everywhere else, the value diversity that characterizes national 
politics makes epistemic democratic assumptions utopian. So maybe epistemic democracy is not 
FRQFHSWXDOO\ZURQJLW¶VMXVWWKDWLW¶VSROLWLFDOO\LUUHOHYDQW7KDW¶VDYHU\JRRGTXHVWLRQEXW,
WKLQNLW¶VDQHPSLULFDOTXHVWLRQWKDWKDVWREHVHWWOHGHPSLULFDOO\/HW¶VVHHZKDWKDSSHQVKRZ
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robust are epistemic democrat models to the introduction of value diversity, and I very much 
WKLQNZHGRQ¶WNQRZ\HWDQGWKDW¶VVWLOODQRSHQTXHVWLRQ 
 
 Nadia Urbinati: Thank you for inviting me here. I would like to take a few minutes to tell 
\RXZK\,¶PQRWFRQYLQFHGWKDWZHOHDUQWRYRWHE\YRWLQJWKDWE\XVLQJGHPRFUDWLFSURFHGXUHV
meaning voting, counting votes, we learn how to do it. It is very problematic for me to show that 
LWLVSRVVLEOHDQGDOVRLWVHHPVWREHDNLQGRILUUHOHYDQWLVVXH,WLVLUUHOHYDQWEHFDXVH,GRQ¶W
believe that democracy, ancient and modern, to the extent that it has one history, emerged as a 
standard for achieving correct decisions²that was never the point. For instance, I was looking 
for citations through history and the beginning of democracy was in the name of the basic 
condition of equality of human beings, liberty, equal rights, representation, power sharing, the 
capacity to come through with real consent. This is what we learn from emancipationists in the 
nineteenth century like Susan Anthony, Thomas Paine, who referred to, not truth or wisdom 
when they called for equal representation, but instead demanded the release from political 
slavery and the right to bear rights. They thought the right to vote for representatives is the 
primary right by which other rights are protected.  
6RLW¶VDTXHVWLRQRIULJKWVSURWHFWLRQZKLFKPHDQVLW¶VDTXHVWLRQRIOLEHUW\SURWHFWLRQ
So equal liberty is the real goal of democracy, we want it for this reason. We may make a lot of 
mistakes in using these rights and this equal liberty, we may produce bad decisions. The decision 
to dismantle the welfare VWDWHLQ(XURSHLVDEDGGHFLVLRQRSSRVHGE\PDQ\GHPRFUDWVLW¶VEDG
IURPP\SRLQWRIYLHZDQGWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRIPDQ\RWKHUVOLNHPH7KDWLVZHGRQ¶WSD\
attention to the fact that when we enter this climate of liberty, engagement, discussion, we 
produce arguments that are sometimes based on values, and thus are partisan, and are thus never 
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so epistemic in their own content. Perhaps they pretend or they give us the sense that they are 
going to produce a better decision, but that is very difficult to say. But certainly, this is a 
UKHWRULFDODUJXPHQWZKHQZHHQWHUSROLWLFV$QGWKHQWKHUH¶VWKHDSRULDWKDWZHKDYHWRZDLWXQWLO
the outcome is produced in order to judge on the epistemic thickness of these processes. Can we 
say in advance that these are good? Or do we have to wait until the outcome is produced? And if 
we have to wait until it is produced, then what is time T, where we decide this is the truth about 
that decision?  
The other concern is²,WKLQNLW¶VWUXHWKDWZHKDYHWRFRQYLQFHWKHDXWRFUDW that 
democracy is better and perhaps a good way of convincing an autocrat is by insisting that 
GHPRFUDF\LVQRWVHFRQGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHDELOLW\LQSURGXFLQJJRRGGHFLVLRQV%XW,¶PQRW
convinced myself that I would be happy with this kind of defense. I would like to say more, that 
democracy does much more than creating the conditions for good possible decisions, which we 
always want. The additional thing it does is, it gives us the certainty that any decision can be 
revised: no matter how good, or perfect, and no matter how incredibly important it is. And this 
for me is the great relevant contribution of democracy. This is its substance because it presumes 
that we are always free to revise our decisions, which presumes that we are fallible in our 
inferences. We can of course make big mistakes, we are not gods after all, which is why we need 
democracy. Together we can achieve a revision of what we have done before.  
So I am very sympathetic with one aspect of the epistemic discourse, particularly in 
+pOqQH¶s book: the description of how together, meaning in a cooperative way, different people 
ZLWKWKHLURZQGLIIHUHQWPHQWDOLWLHVDQGGLIIHUHQWGLYHUVLWLHVDQGFRJQLWLYHLQWHUHVWVWKH\¶UHDEOH
to cooperate for a common cause. This is the pragmatic element of democracy as a way of living 
together in such a discursive way and accepting to count heads when we disagree and giving up 
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WKLVLGHDWKDWWKHUHLVXQDQLPLW\8QDQLPLW\LVQRWWKHVRXUFHRIGHPRFUDF\LW¶VPDMRULW\UXOH
because we presume permanent disagreement. And we presume permanent disagreement; unless 
ZHGRQ¶WDVVXPHWKDWWKHUHLVDVHDUFKIRUWUXWK,WKLQNZHFDQDJUHHWKDWZHVHDUFKRXWWKH
better, this I can agree, and that it is better that it be measured. Measure it, somehow, but the 
measurement is always open to judgment and my judgment can be different from yours because 
ZHGRQ¶WKDYHDPDWKHPDWLFDOPHDVXUHPHQWWKLVLVSROLWLFVDIWHUDOO)RUWKLVUHDVRQ²LW¶VQRWWR
trash or to vilify the value of an epistemic effort to make democracy better in the eyes of those 
ZKRGRQ¶WEHOLHYHLQGHPRFUDF\²EXWRQO\WKDWIRUWKRVHZKRGRQ¶WEHOLHYHLQLWLW¶VRQO\WRQRW
ask from it more than it can promise.  
:KDWGHPRFUDF\FDQSURPLVHLVHTXDOOLEHUW\WRUHYLVH$QGWKDWLVKXJHO\LPSRUWDQW,W¶V
not somethiQJPLQRULW¶VYHU\VXEVWDQWLDOEHFDXVHLWKDVWKHDELOLW\ZKLFKIRUPHLVYHU\
important²the intrinsic quality of democracy is the ability to maintain equal political liberty 
through time. So to reproduce itself, this is the outcome issue: to reproduce itself in its own 
IRXQGDWLRQ,W¶VQRWDRQH-WLPHHYHQWGHPRFUDF\LW¶VDSUDFWLFHLQWHVWLQJPDLQWDLQLQJ
maintenance programs, actually. Maintaining democratic procedures, this is what political 
democracy does.  
%XWLIZHDJUHHRQWKDWGRQ¶WZHWKLQNWhat the epistemic moment is little bit redundant? 
Because liberty, we said, and we can all accept, is the justification for the substance of 
democracy, not some specific outcome, because nobody can select one specific outcome or that 
would be the sovereign. So not even when some experts judge something correctly, liberty is a 
justification and substance without paying too much attention to what the experts tell us.  
Now procedures are by definition regulated doings with an open outcome, we know that. 
Democratic procedures are driven by the goal of reproducing the democratic condition itself. In 
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this sense²and this is very important for me²they cannot produce unjust results, or results that 
deny the condition for democracy, such as labor and gender domination, ethnical or cultural 
privileges. A democratic decision is unjust if it violates its very own principle, if it produces 
outcomes that are against its own possibilities for reproducing itself.  
So if this is the just outcome, is it not enough an epistemic outcome inside of the system, 
inside of the procedure? Is not this the good and the just? As a matter of fact, constitutional 
checks on the legislative assembly are intended not to make lawmakers act according to some 
epistemic criterion of truth, but to make them act legitimately, that is, according to the principle 
of democracy, and responsibly, that is, in order for the people to be able to judge what they do. 
These are indeed the normative requirements for a good, and in this case procedurally correct, 
political process of decision making. As Frank Michelman has argued many times, lawmaking 
procedures produce laws that are valid, not that are true. Robert Post has applied this argument to 
the defense of free speech, the First Amendment, arguing that indeed the First Amendment 
GRHVQ¶WSURWHFWgood speech or correct speech, but free, but also perhaps wrong. So this is the 
goodness, of democratic outcomes, to reproduce the good condition that makes democracy 
possible. Is this not an epistemic thickness? Is it not enough? And is it not redundant to insist on 
more? 
Finally, a very, very last point, I ask myself, why now is there an epistemic need, why 
now this epistemic call? Why is it not enough now to say we go to vote, everyone should go to 
vote, and to ask for participation in the political process, regardless of our desired outcomes? 
Why now the infiltration of this technocratic mentality of solving problems, which makes us 
think of democracy as another name for technocratic doing with the approval of the people? 
Plato is not democratic even if he is egalitarian because he presumes some equal condition that 
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ZHDOOKDYH7KHUHLVDQHOHPHQWRIHTXDOLW\EXWLW¶VQRWGHPRFUDWLF6RP\TXHVWLRQWKHQDQG,
finally conclude, is whether, perhaps underneath, unconsciously, there is a sense that this old 
democratic ambition of solving questions of disagreement through voting is insufferable. How 
can a vote be asked for when the question is the truth? Truth cannot be voted on or against. It 
makes no sense, and this is outrageous, that you decide by voting, by raising hands, by counting, 
equal quantitative portions of our will²how can this be?  
Indeed, in some of the literature recently criticizing incompetent voters, Bryan Caplan 
wrote rthat because there are certain SHRSOHKDELWXDOQRQYRWHUVZKRVH³DEVHQFHRQHOHFWLRQGD\V
LVDJRRGWKLQJDVLWDFWXDOO\KHOSVGHPRFUDF\ZRUNEHWWHU´>ÅCitation needed]²better not to 
vote than to vote incompetently.  
The epistemic deficiencies identified by some epistemic social scientists or political 
VFLHQWLVWVDUHJHQHUDOO\RIWZRW\SHVHLWKHUPDQ\YRWHUVGRQ¶WNQRZKRZWRJHWZKDWWKH\ZDQW
RUWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZKRZWRZDQWZKDWWKH\VKRXOG&DSODQUHSRUWVRQVXUYH\GDWDVKRZLQJWKDW
³PRVWYRWHUVDUHGHHSO\FRQIXVHGDERXWWKHLURZQLnterests, about why their beliefs about 
HFRQRPLFVLVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\PLVWDNHQ´>ÅCitation needed] So better not to vote, and better to 
select those who know better. Or concentrate on the small number of persons selected by the 
followers from the general mass as more likely to possess the information and discernment to 
solve the complicated questions, so that small groups, deliberative small assemblies are better 
than voting.  
The epistemic democrats are able to make me think a lot about the value of democracy, 
regardless of the outcome that democracy gives us²since democracy may give us very bad 
GHFLVLRQV%XWZHZRXOGQ¶WH[FKDQJHLWIRUDQRWKHUV\VWHPDOVREHFDXVHwe are those who 
decide which decision is better or not. If self-government and the immanent principle of 
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judgment concerning the truth so-called are at issue, if we are the actors and the judges all 
together, there is no such thing as an external reference point of view; otherwise that external 
reference point of view is the source of sovereignty for judging democracy. But for now, 
democracy is sovereign. 
 
 Daniel Viehoff: I, like Nadia, face the problem of deciding whether I should say what I 
was meaning to say when I came in, or respond to what has been said by my co-panelists. But I 
WKLQN,¶OOWDNHDPLGGOHFRXUVH/HWPHEHJLQE\EULHIO\VD\LQJVRPHWKLQJDERXWKRZZHVKRXOd 
XQGHUVWDQGHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDF\DQGWDONRIµWUXWK¶LQWKHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W2QHLQVLJKWWKDW¶V
come out of the recent discussions of epistemic democracy is that we can adopt a 
FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIZKDWLVµHSLVWHPLF¶DERXWHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDF\WKDWLVPRre sophisticated than 
ZKDWKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\EHHQRIIHUHG$VDUHVXOW,GRQ¶WWKLQNZHVKRXOGILQGWDONRIµWUXWK¶LQ
SROLWLFVWRRZRUU\LQJ,WKLQNLW¶VSUHWW\FOHDUWKDWZHKDYHDJRRGJUDVSRIZKDWWKHUHOHYDQW
epistemic concerns are in the individual domain. We know that there are contexts where there are 
more or less correct beliefs, and we know that there are types of belief formation that are more or 
less reliable relative to those standards of correctness. And whatever those standards are, we can 
ask broadly similar questions about the reliability of democracy, about collective decision 
making, without having any deep, serious commitments either to what exactly the truth is or to 
there being somebody who has independent access to the truth. Just as we can think that people 
have a better or worse grasp of what morality requires, and that you can have more or less 
reliable moral judgments on a variety of issues, without thinking that there is someone out there 
who has a full grasp of the moral truth, so the same thing can be said about democracy. When we 
discuss the epistemic dimension of democracy, the epistemic virtues that democracy purportedly 
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has, we refer to the ways in which democratic procedures may be more or less reliable in 
tracking whatever the relevant moral standards are, more or less reliable compared to other forms 
of decision making. All of this is just by way of an initial characterization of how we should 
think about epistemic democracy.  
Now I think Jack was exactly right in highlighting that we must distinguish among a 
variety of questions we want to ask about epistemic democracy. My focus is going to be solely 
RQWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDWKHFDOOHGLWV³QRUPDWLYHVLJQLILFDQFH´+HUHLVP\WKRXJKW/HW¶VJUDQW
for now that a lot of the arguments for the epistemic virtues of democracy in fact succeed²
although I have some comments on that later. That still leaves open the question of what exactly 
IROORZVIURPGHPRFUDF\¶VHSLVWHPLFYLUWXHV,WVHHPVWRPHWKDWRXUGLVFXVVLRQVRIHSLVWHPLF
democracy are sometimes less useful than they could be because of a failure to distinguish 
between a variety of conceptually and practically quite separate normative questions that we 
want to ask about democratic institutions. Here I want to draw a distinction between just two²
there are more one could invoke, but two will do for us this morning. One question is of an 
LQVWLWXWLRQ¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQRUMXVWLILDELOLW\ZKLFK,WDNHWREHDTXHVWLRQDERXWZKHWKHUWKLV
institution is worth having or not worth having. Is having this institution preferable to having no 
institution, or another institution that fulfills roughly similar tasks? If you want to make this more 
concrete, you can think of this as the question we have to ask ourselves when engaging in 
institutional design. If we want to establish a set of institutions, should we establish this set of 
institutions or try to establish others?  
7KLVLVLPSRUWDQWO\GLVWLQFWIURPZKDW,FDOOWKHTXHVWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\¶VDXWKRULW\7KH
TXHVWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\¶VDXWKRULW\LVWKHTXHVWLRQZKHWKHUGHPRFUDWLFRXWFRPHVZKLFK,WDNHWR
be decisions, have a certain normative quality for those to whom they purportedly apply. It asks: 
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µ'RWKRVHZKRFRXQWDVVXEMHFWVRUFLWL]HQVKDYHUHDVRQWRJRDORQJZLWKDGHFLVLRQHYHQLIWKH\
PD\VXEVWDQWLYHO\GLVDJUHHZLWKLW"¶7KLVLVDSRLQWWKDW1DGLDHPSKDVL]HGDVEHLQJFUXFLDO± the 
Michelman point about validity that runs through our thinking about laws, and indeed through 
our thinking about democracy. Putting that point slightly more generally: If you think democracy 
is a decision-making procedure, and if you adopt what I would think is the best account of 
decision-making, which views decisions as binding reasons of a certain sort, then an adequate 
theory of democracy has to explain how it can be that the outcome of a democratic procedure is a 
binding decision, is a binding reason for those people whom it purports to bind. That is a really 
important question that we want to keep an eye on in democratic theory, even though I think it 
tends to be somewhat neglected.  
The reason I draw this distinction between justification and authority is the following: I 
think there arHYHU\SODXVLEOHDUJXPHQWVIRUEHOLHYLQJWKDWHSLVWHPLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQVVLPSO\FDQ¶W
be ignored when we think about justifications for institutions. Here is a very easy way to see this: 
Just limit yourself to the choice among democratic institutions. Just consider various ways of 
ordering institutions, all of which would be democratic in a variety of ways ± unicameral 
legislatures or bicameral ones, institutions that grant veto powers to some players, rules that 
require some period during which deliberation takes place before a vote is taken, and so on. It 
seems to me that, when we think of these choices, we cannot but consider whether, these 
arrangements are going to be beneficial from an epistemic point of view. It just seems to me 
difficult to ignore the significance of such epistemic considerations. They may not be decisive. 
There may be other considerations. Nonetheless, when we choose among various forms of 
democratic institutions, there is a clear concern with various epistemic virtues that might or 
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might not be instantiated. Thus at the level of justification, there is almost always going to a 
place for epistemic considerations.  
The crucial point I want to make now is that things gets a lot more difficult when we turn 
WRGHPRFUDF\¶VDXWKRULW\,WHQGWo think that appeals to epistemic considerations are a fairly 
implausible basis for establishing our duty to obey democratic decisions even though we 
GLVDJUHHZLWKWKHP7KLVLVQ¶WEHFDXVH,EHOLHYHWKDWHSLVWHPLFFRQVLGHUDWLRQVFDQQHYHUMXVWLI\
practical DXWKRULW\6RPHWLPHVVRPHERG\¶VJUHDWHUUHOLDELOLW\RUH[SHUWLVHGRHVLQGHHGJURXQG
P\GXW\WRREH\WKHP-XVWFRQVLGHUDYHU\VLPSOHFDVH,¶PRQDSODQHVRPHERG\KDVDKHDUW
DWWDFN,FRXOGHDVLO\VDYHWKHP,MXVWGRQ¶WNQRZKRZ0\ZLIHKDSSHQVWRNQow how, but she 
FDQ¶WGRLWKHUVHOI,IVKHQRZGLUHFWVPHWRWDNHFHUWDLQVWHSVWRVDYHWKHYLFWLP,DOPRVW
certainly have a duty to do as she directs me to do.  
6RLW¶VQRWLQSULQFLSOHLPSRVVLEOHWRGHULYHSUDFWLFDODXWKRULW\IURPHSLVWHPLFUHOLDELOLW\ 
or epistemic virtues. But there are a variety of issues in the political domain and in the domain of 
democracy that make this inference from epistemic virtue to authority a lot more difficult. I just 
ZDQWWRIODJWKUHHRIWKHP7KHILUVWLVWKLVLW¶VYHUy important to recognize that, when we want 
WRHVWDEOLVKRQHSLVWHPLFJURXQGV$¶VDXWKRULW\RYHU%RQHSHUVRQ¶VDXWKRULW\RYHUDQRWKHU
WKHQZHFDQ¶WGRWKLVVLPSO\E\VKRZLQJWKDW$LVJHQHUDOO\UHDOO\UHOLDEOHRUHSLVWHPLFDOO\
virtuous. To establish A¶VDXWKRULW\RYHU%RQHSLVWHPLFJURXQGVUHTXLUHVDFRPSDUDWLYHFODLP
$LVPRUHUHOLDEOHWKDQ%-XVWWKLQNEDFNWRWKHHDUOLHUH[DPSOH,GRQ¶WQHHGWRGRZKDWP\ZLIH
WHOOVPHWRGRRQWKHSODQHLIWKRXJKVKH¶VDYHU\UHOLDEOHMXGJHRIKRZWRVDYHVRPHRQH¶VOLIH
VRDP,1RZOHW¶VWXUQEDFNWRGHPRFUDF\¶VDXWKRULW\6LQFHZH¶UHWDONLQJDERXWDXWKRULW\RYHU
FLWL]HQVDQDUJXPHQWWKDWDSSHDOVWRGHPRFUDF\¶VHSLVWHPLFYLUWXHVWRMXVWLI\LWVDXWKRULW\KDVWR
establish that the outcome of democratic procedures is more reliable than the judgment of 
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LQGLYLGXDOFLWL]HQV7KLVLVYHU\LPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHLWPHDQVWKDWDFHUWDLQVWUDWHJ\WKDW¶VEHHQ
influential in thinking about the virtues of democracy, while generally useful for thinking about 
GHPRFUDF\¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQMXVWGRHVQ¶WJHWPXFKRIDJULSRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIDXWKRULW\,KDYHLQ
mind here arguments which establish that democratic deliberation improves the judgment of 
LQGLYLGXDOSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHSURFHVV%HFDXVHLIWKDW¶VDOOGHPRFUDF\ does, then it 
GRHVQ¶WLQIDFWLPSURYHWKHUHODWLYHUHOLDELOLW\RIWKHGHPRFUDWLFRXWFRPHVYLV-à-vis the individual 
judgment. Rather, it undermines the very gap that you need to establish the authority of the 
outcome for the particular subject.  
My second point is this. Elsewhere I argue that the fact RIJUHDWHUUHOLDELOLW\LVQ¶W\HW
VXIILFLHQWWRHVWDEOLVKWKHVXEMHFW¶VUHDVRQWRWUHDWDVELQGLQJWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHSURFHGXUH,W
also has to be the case that the subject is in a position to reliably identify the would-be authority 
as more reliable [Viehoff, Forthcoming]. Here is why it is important: Quite frequently, by virtue 
RIWKHVKHHUIDFWWKDW,¶PQRWDJRRGMXGJHRIZKDW,PRUDOO\RXJKWWRGR,¶PDOVRQRWDJRRG
MXGJHRIZKR¶VDJRRGMXGJHRIZKDW,PRUDOO\RXJKWWRGR,GRQ¶WLPSURYHP\HSLVWHPLF
situation by trying to defer to other people; I just replicate the problem of uncertainty that I have, 
in regards to the substantive matter, when I instead try to rely on the authority of someone ± or 
some procedure ± more reliable than I am. Now I think this is important because at least some of 
the arguments that epistemic democrats have advanced for establishing the greater reliability or 
the epistemic virtues of democratic decisions depend on conditions with regard to which 
ordinary citizens are usually not reliable judges. The most obvious case is the Condorcet Jury 
7KHRUHPZKLFKGHSHQGVRQDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHUHOLDELOLW\RIRQH¶VIHOORZFLWL]HQVLQFDVWLQJ
WKHLUYRWH%XWWKDW¶VMXVWWKHNLQGRIWKLQJ DERXWZKLFK,GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\UHOLDEOHLQIRUPDWLRQ
7KHIDFWWKDWWKHUH¶VDQRXWFRPHRIDFHUWDLQVRUWWKDWLVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUFDVWLQJWKHLUYRWHVLQD
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FHUWDLQZD\GRHVQ¶W\HWJLYHPHUHDVRQWRGHIHUWRWKHLUYRWHVEHFDXVH,FDQQRWUHOLDEO\
determine whether the conditions are met that would make the outcome of the voting procedure 
especially reliable.  
The third point, which is also crucial, is the following: In the political domain, unlike in 
WKHFDVHWKDW,PHQWLRQHGDERXWGHIHUULQJWRP\ZLIH¶VDXWKRrity, claims are in regard not only to 
means, but also to ends. My wife tells me how to save the victim of the heart attack. I have 
UHDVRQWRGRZKDWVKHWHOOVPHWRGRLILQIDFW,KDYHUHDVRQWRVDYHKLP%XWP\ZLIHGRHVQ¶W
claim the power to tell me that I must save him even if I have in fact no reason to do so. By 
FRQWUDVWSROLWLFDODXWKRULW\GRHVQ¶WMXVWWHOOXVµ+HUH¶VZKDW\RXRXJKWWRGRDVVXPLQJ\RXKDYH
JRRGUHDVRQWRGR;+HUH¶VKRZPXFKWD[\RXVKRXOGSD\DVVXPLQJWKHUH¶VJRRGUHDVRQWR
KDYHDUHGLVWULEXWLYHWD[V\VWHP¶5DWKHUWKHVWDWHFODLPVIRULWVHOIWKHSRZHUWRGHWHUPLQHWKDW
certain ends are ones we ought to pursue, to adopt. But that ups the ante a whole lot for 
establishing the epistemic virtue that we would want our political institutions to have. For 
instance, if you think that democratic authority makes this kind of claim, then to establish that 
GHPRFUDF\KDVSROLWLFDODXWKRULW\RQHSLVWHPLFJURXQGV\RX¶GKDYHWRVKRZWKDWGHPRFUDF\LV
more reliable than individual subjects are with regards to the question what ends are worth 
pursuing. This is essentially a moral judgment, and I think many people worry that the arguments 
ZHKDYHIRUGHPRFUDF\¶VHSLVWHPLFYLUWXHGRQ¶WH[WHQGHDVLO\WRFDVHVRIPRUDOMXGJPHQW,WKLQN
Hélène acWXDOO\PRUHRUOHVVFRQFHGHVVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKLVLQKHUERRNDQGLW¶VRQHRIWKH
questions she leaves us with: Can the epistemic argument for democracy be extended to the 
FKRLFHRIHQGV",WKLQNWKHUHDUHUHDVRQVIRUWKLQNLQJLWFDQ¶WEH7KHFRQGLWLRQVRf the Hong-
3DJHWKHRUHPRQZKLFK+HOHQHFHQWUDOO\UHOLHVDUHVXFKWKDWLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZRQH
FDQH[WHQGLWWRWKHFDVHRIPRUDOGLVDJUHHPHQW>+RQJDQG3DJH@,WKLQNWKDW¶VRQHRIWKH
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challenges one has to face as an epistemic democrat, at least if one wants to give a full account of 
the normative significance of democracy. 
,ZDQWWRILQLVKE\UDLVLQJRQHTXHVWLRQZKLFK,GRQ¶WUHDOO\NQRZZKDWWRWKLQNRIEXW
that seems to go to the heart of some of our discussion. I think people who are not epistemic 
democrats, and who think that democratic authority is most plausibly grounded in broad 
considerations of equality, must ask themselves the following: Granting that there are certain 
issues with regard to which democracy lacks the authorit\LWRXJKWWRKDYHZKDW¶VWKHQRUPDWLYH
VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKDWZKHQLW¶VWUDGHGRIIDJDLQVWLWVDFWXDOO\PDNLQJEHWWHUGHFLVLRQV"6RKRZGR
we think about claims to authority that democracy has vis-à-vis claims about the quality of 
democratic outcomes, even if these outcomes lack authority? To make this most concrete: 
Imagine people who mistakenly believe they have reason to follow democratic decisions. But as 
it happens, these decisions are in fact more reliable than decisions made in other ways. That 
seems to me to be a really deep normative issue, a different question about how to think 
conceptually about the relationship between outcomes and the demands of authority in thinking 
about decision making institutions. Getting a better grip on that might help us understand how 
various tradeoffs may or may not be possible and help us understand why some people think that 
WKHUHMXVWWKHUHLVQ¶WURRPIRUWUDGHRIIV 
 I get to continue now, qua chair, as we open the floor for discussion. One point worth 
raising, which I should have raised at the start, is that Critical Review is hoping to publish the 
proceedings of this panel. I understand one thought might be to include some of the comments 
IURPWKH4	$,I\RX¶GEHZLOOLQJWREHLQFOXGHGLQWKLVZD\SOHDVHPDNHVure to come to the 
front or take this recording device so that your question is properly recorded as we proceed. 
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 Jeffrey Friedman: If you would identify yourself, your name, and institution clearly so 
we can get your permission to publish the results, thDW¶OOKHOSXV 
  
 Michael Mosher, University of Tulsa: This is a question directed more or less to Nadia 
DQGWR+pOqQH,JXHVV,ILQGLWXQGHQLDEOHWKDWSUDJPDWLFFRQVHTXHQFHVRIGHPRFUDF\FRXQWOHW¶V
VD\IRULQVWDQFHWKDW\RX¶UHDGHHSHJDOLWDULDQEXW\ou find that the more egalitarian a democracy 
tends to become the less it can avoid disastrous wars, depression, inability to address obvious 
truth claims, the kind of things most democracies have difficulty doing but so do all other 
systems of government. But I would say that even Nadia is an epistemic democrat on the 
Tocquevillian criterion that you have the equal right to revise; for if you believe that this equal 
ULJKWWRUHYLVHGRHVQRWDFWXDOO\LPSURYHWKLQJVWKHQLW¶VMXVWPDNLQJQHZGHFLVLRQVIRUWhe sake 
RIPDNLQJQHZGHFLVLRQV6R\RXPXVWEHOLHYHWKDW\RX¶UHUHYLVLQJIRUWKHVDNHRILPSURYLQJDQG
as a consequence, to some extent, you too are concerned with the epistemic outcome, as 
Tocqueville was, of democracy.  
 But my question to Hélène is, having read her book and been very impressed by it, and 
LQGHHGLPSUHVVHGE\DOOWKHDUJXPHQWVIRUGHPRFUDF\WKDW¶VLPSOLFLWLQPDQ\RIWKHWKLQJV1DGLD
said is implicit in the argument for both proceduralism and majority rule, nevertheless I keep 
thinking thDWDV,¶PUHDGLQJWKLVWH[W,¶PUHPLQGHGRI5RXVVHDXZKRWKRXJKWRIKLPVHOIDVD
realist but his book, the Social Contract is taken as an ideal statement of an impossibility, and 
now Hélène has written a kind of similar book, where she and I think Jack Knight as well, 
specifying all of the very difficult-to-achieve conditions, such that now we can actually use the 
old Soviet phrase, actually existing socialism to refer to what we have as actually existing 
GHPRFUDF\'RQ¶WWKRVHNLQGVRIKLJKVWDQGDUGVDVRpposed to adopting some more minimal 
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VWDQGDUGGRQ¶WWKH\DFWXDOO\WHQGWRGHOHJLWLPL]HDFWXDOO\H[LVWLQJGHPRFUDF\",I\RXUZRUN
EHFRPHVPRUHSXEOLFOHW¶VVD\RXWVLGHRIWKLVURRPRURXWVLGHRIWKHSDQHOLVLWSRVVLEOHWKDW
this will have a depressing and deflationary effect on actually existing democracy? 
 
 Landemore: One response is Vive la Revolution<HVLW¶VSRVVLEOHEXWLQIDFWWKH
GHSUHVVLQJFRQFOXVLRQ,NLQGRIUHDFKHGLVWKDW,GRQ¶WWKLQNZHKDYHDQ\UHDOGHPRFUDFLHV
anywhere. The truth is you can look at democracy on a continuum, and so what I describe is kind 
of on the high extreme of the continuum and where we live is really low. So writing that book 
made me realize, wow, I thought I grew up in a democracy²not really. And I thought I came to 
DGHPRFUDF\WKH86DQG,WKLQNVRFLDOO\LW¶VPRUHWUXHWKDQ)UDQFHEXWSROLWLFDOO\DEVROXWHO\
QRW:H¶YHJRWWKHVRFLDO-VFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFHWRSURYHLWOLNH0DUWLQ*LOHQVDQG%HQ3DJHWKDW¶V
ULJKWWKHUHWKHUH¶V]HURVWDWLVWLFDOFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHen the will of the majority and policy 
outcomes, what more do we need [Gilens and Page 2014]? So this is not democracy. So we can 
NHHSXVLQJ³GHPRFUDF\´WRIHHOJRRGDERXWRXUVHOYHVEXWZH¶UHQRWUHDOO\OLYLQJLQRQH6RDVIRU
the effect my book will have:HDOVRDUHLQDFULVLVVWDJHVRPD\EHLW¶VWLPHWRWKLQNDOLWWOHELW
RXWVLGHRIWKHER[DQGUHYLVLWWKLQJVOLNHHOHFWLRQVLWDOOVRXQGVXWRSLDQDQG,GRQ¶WH[SHFWP\
ERRNWRKDYHDQ\RIWKHLPSDFWWKDW\RX¶UHGHVFULELQJVR,¶PQRWWRRZRUULHG,¶PDpolitical 
WKHRULVWWKDW¶VZKDW,GRZK\FDQ¶W,SXVKWKDWNLQGRIWKRXJKWWRDQH[WUHPH",¶PQRWVXUHLI
your question is asking me to be more sensitive to the practical implication of my thinking and I 
QHYHUWKRXJKWWKDWZD\DQGGRQ¶WWKLQN,¶PJRLQJWR start now.  
 To the point Nadia made that democracy should be defined as constitutional democracy 
VRDOOWKHHSLVWHPLFEHQHILWVZHGHVFULEHVKRXOGLQIDFWEXLOWLQWRWKHGHILQLWLRQVRZHGRQ¶WKDYH
WRWDONDERXWWKDWDQ\PRUHDQGEH\RQGWKDWLW¶VDOOSURFHGXUDOLVPDQGLWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUZKHWKHULW
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leads to good outcomes. I disagree with that, because what you build into a constitutional 
GHPRFUDF\LVQRWHQRXJK\RX¶UHJRLQJWREXLOGLQFHUWDLQWKLQJVOLNHSURWHFWLRQRILQGLYLGXDO
ULJKWVEXWWKDW¶VQRWHQRXgh, you can have a regime that does that but still fails to produce 
HFRQRPLFSROLFLHVWKDWZRUNIRUWKHFRPPXQLW\,WKLQNLW¶VPRUHGHPDQGLQJHSLVWHPLF
FRQVLGHUDWLRQVDUHPRUHGHPDQGLQJWKDQMXVWWKDWEDVHOLQH$QGDOVR,WKLQNWKDW¶VDPXFK
broader debate to explore in depth, as before, is democracy just a certain majoritarian procedure 
combined with some deliberation, and then we add the liberal framework and call that 
democracy, or do you want to have a thick conception of democracy that makes it constitutional 
by definition?  
 %DVLFDOO\LW¶VDTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHPRFUDF\LVDUHGXQGDQWSKUDVH,VWDUW
IURPDWKLQFRQFHSWLRQEHFDXVH,WKLQNWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSDUW,ZRXOGZDQWWRDGG,¶GZDQWWR
give an evolutionary account of it. You start with a thin conception, just talking together, taking 
DYRWHDQGWKHQDV\RXOHDUQRYHUWLPHWKDWLI\RXMXVWGRWKDWZLWKRXWEXLOGLQJDVDIHJXDUG\RX¶OO
end up violating minority rights and do all sorts of wrong things and undermine the conditions of 
ZKDW\RXDOUHDG\KDYH$QGWKHQ\RXDGGWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGOLEHUDODSSDUDWXVEXWLW¶V
FRQFHSWXDOO\DQGDQDO\WLFDOO\GLVWLQFW,¶OOVWRSKHUH 
 
 Urbinati: Very briefly, on this issue, well, I try to define democracy to get at two 
elements: the institutional and the extra-institutional, and sometimes extra-procedural. We can 
discuss without institutions and procedures, or we can disagree without talking to each other, we 
can turn our back toward others. When we go to vote, you need to say, I take with myself many 
things, my visions, my idiosyncratic beliefs, my desires, so the vote is a kind of registration of 
many, many things, belonging to a situated citizen, which is never an abstraction. But we need to 
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abstract in order to make judgments concerning what these citizens are doing. Constitutional life 
LVDOVRRXWVLGHLQVWLWXWLRQVLW¶VDQHWKLFDOZD\RISUDFWLFLQJDVFLWL]HQVVRWKHZRUG³FRQVWLWXWLRQ´
is itself a way of learning how to live together.  
 The other question is about the diversity: I have a note in my presentation and I skipped 
it, but epistemic diversity, this is a great important point, that we have diverse perspectives and 
capabilities, but would you also agree on value diversity? We are all different in our knowledge 
in our comprehension of what we do, in our understanding, but do we assume also value 
GLYHUVLW\"7KDWLVDPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGLVVXHEHFDXVH\RXSUHVXPH\RX¶UHYHU\FOHDUD
unanimous condition/conception of what is the value of liberty, why do we value equal liberty. 
So we need to have a unanimous view on value, at least on one thing, in order to have epistemic 
diversity working; otherwise, the diversity brings us to disagreement that is unsolvable, and that 
LVDFKRLFH\RXFDQ¶WPDNHIURPDQHSLVWHPLFYLHZ 
 
 Knight: Just a couple of quick things, on this issue of delegitimizing democracy. I agree 
with what Hélène said, I think our work in many ways does do that. I worry about that 
somewhat. In the acknowledgment of that book with Jim Johnson, I said that there are days when 
people ask me, why do you spend so much time writing about democracy, look how horribly it 
ZRUNV"$QG,WKLQNWKHUH¶VVRPHWKLQJWRWKDW1RZ,WKRXJKW\RXPLJKWEHVXJJHVWLQJ²or some 
people have suggested²the political theory equivalent to the point they make about teaching 
microeconomics to undergraduates, that if we teach them microeconomics with the assumption 
of self-LQWHUHVWZH¶OOFRUURGHWKHLUFRPPXQLW\DQGWKH\¶OOEHFRPHZKDWWKHPRGHOVXJJHVWV
WKH\¶OOEHDQGZHPD\EHGRLQJWKDWFRPSDUDEO\LIZHfocus just on the instrumental 
consequence of democracy, are we doing that too? That, I have no idea.  
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 Landemore2QWKLVSRLQW,¶PQRWVXUHZH¶UHVD\LQJWKHVDPHWKLQJ<RX¶UHFRQFHGLQJ
WKDWE\WDONLQJDERXWWKHLQVWUXPHQWDOSURSHUWLHVRIGHPRFUDF\ZH¶re delegitimizing it. 
 
 Knight1R,¶PQRW,ZDVMXVWVD\LQJWKDWZDVDVHSDUDWHSRLQW 
 
 LandemoreVRWKHQ,DJUHH%XWZKHQ\RXVD\ZH¶UHGHOHJLWLPL]LQJGHPRFUDF\QRQR
QRZH¶UHGHOHJLWLPL]LQJZKDWSDVVHVDVGHPRFUDF\,ZRXOGFDOOWKDWrepresentative government, 
VRPHNLQGRIPL[HGUHJLPHZLWKSRSXOLVWHOHPHQWVZLWKORWVRIDULVWRFUDWLFIHDWXUHV:H¶UHQRW
GHOHJLWLPL]LQJGHPRFUDF\LIDQ\WKLQJZH¶UHHOHYDWLQJWKHUHDOFRQFHSWRIGHPRFUDF\E\VKRZLQJ
WKDWLWKDVSURSHUWLHVWKDWZHGLGQ¶WHYHQNQRZLWKDGDQGLW¶VEHWWHUWKDQZHWKRXJKW,IWKHUH¶V
anything positive coming out of this, we should try to tweak the current system to bring it closer 
WRZKDWZHFDOOGHPRFUDF\2QHRIWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVLQP\YLHZZKLFK,GRQ¶WWKLQNZRXOGEH
revolutionary and dangerous, is we should probably try to include more people in the process, 
listen more carefully to what people have to say and make the representative system act more 
representative about what people want. And there are all sorts of things that can be done. I see 
Jim Fishkin in the room; we can try to practice, have deliberative systems that are actually being 
done and thought about at the grassroots level. You never hear about at the national level, there 
must be reasons why. 
 
 Knight: Can I just say, I want to clarify, the delegitimizing I was talking about was about 
existing institutions. You need to understand, Hélène always brings me back in when I fall off 
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WKHZDJRQ,GLGQ¶WXVHGWRWKLQNDERXWP\VHOIDVDQHSLVWHPLFGHPRFUDWXQWLOVKHtold me that I 
ZDVVRZH¶UHVWLOOVRUWLQJWKDWRXW 
 The one other thing I want to say, you asked what we meant by democratic procedures. 
Actually, I also work with a fairly thin conception of that, looking at certain basic mechanisms 
that I think a lot of different forms of institutions have in terms of majority rule, free discourse, 
UHIOH[LYLW\WKRVHNLQGVRIWKLQJV,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUH¶VWKDWPXFKZRUNGRQHEXW,WKLQNLWZRXOG
be interesting to do that, to look at more specific types of decision making within the democratic 
umbrella and to see if some of those which have some of these mechanism and have other details 
WRRPD\HQKDQFHRUQRWWKHVRUWRIHSLVWHPLFDVSHFWVR,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUH¶VEHHQPXFKZRUN
done. 
 
 Viehoff: I wanted to say one final thing on this²,GRQ¶WPHDQWRVD\LW¶VILQDOEXWDQRWKHU
observation²RQWKLVZRUU\DERXWGHOHJLWLPL]LQJLQVWLWXWLRQVEHFDXVH,¶PQRWVXUHHLWKHURI\RX
TXLWHGLGMXVWLFHWRWKDWZRUU\+HUHLVKRZ,ZRXOGSXWLW6RPHRQHPLJKWVD\µ/RRN\RXWDONHG
a ORWDERXWWKHHSLVWHPLFGLPHQVLRQRIGHPRFUDF\%XW,¶POHVVRSWLPLVWLFWKDQ\RXDUHWKDWLW¶V
under the control of the state to do all that would be required to instantiate a system that would 
have epistemic success. So if I have misgivings about the epistemic argument for democracy, 
WKHQZKDW¶VOHIWJLYHQWKDWZHKDYHQ¶WEHHQWROGDQ\WKLQJHOVHDERXWWKHRWKHUYDOXHVWKH
SURFHGXUDOYDOXHV"¶7KDWSHUVRQPLJKWZDONDZD\WKLQNLQJµ7KHUHZDVRQHDUJXPHQWIRU
GHPRFUDF\¶VOHJLWLPDF\,WGLGQ¶WSDQRXW6ROHW¶VJRIRUVRPHRWKHUIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQW¶
7KHUH¶VDSHUIHFWO\JRRGDQVZHUWRWKDWWKRXJKWWKHUHDUHRWKHUGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHVZHFDUHDERXW
egalitarian values, etc. But I think that people sometimes worry that the emphasis put on 
epistemic considerations PDNHVLWVHHPOLNHWKDWLW¶VDQH[FOXVLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ 
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 Landemore7KDW¶VYHU\WUXH 
 
 Urbinati: This is very important in my view, because democracy stands for everything 
QRZLW¶VDQLGHRORJLFDOGHILQLWLRQYHU\GDQJHURXVLQP\YLHZEHFDXVHGHPRFUDF\is just a 
political system, a political way of solving our disagreements in a way that allows us to solve all 
the time, continuously. But the question of economic equality for instance, this would require a 
social argument more than a democratic argument. Yes, we need to have perhaps basic 
conditions for a democracy, but who knows if the basic condition of being more affluent 
translates into me going to vote? We tend to give democracy too much of this business to do. I 
mean, economic equality, diversity, ethical formation, these are perhaps other issues. 
 
 Viehoff2.OHW¶VFROOHFWPRUHTXHVWLRQV 
 
 Sam Bagg from Duke. The question is, one way you might improve the epistemic quality 
of decisions is to argue directly for what you think the right answer is. BXWWKDWFDQ¶WEH
everything that an epistemic democrat is supposed to do, for in order for epistemic democracy to 
have different recommendations or different outcomes than some theory of justice or some other 
theory, whatever its competitors are, you have to have some situations where there are tradeoffs 
between the right answer or what you think the right outcome should be and what epistemic 
democracy recommends, a conflict between some procedural or something that would improve 
epistemic quality overall versus getting the right answer in the moment. So I wonder, are there 
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situations like that? Is epistemic democracy going to have different outcomes than whatever the 
right substantive answer is, and how do you make those kinds of tradeoffs? 
 
 My name is Anthoula Malkopoulou DQG,¶PIURP8SSVDOD8QLYHUVLW\0\TXHVWLRQLVLI
ZHDFFHSWWKDWZHFDQKDYHDV\QWKHWLFYLHZLWFDQEHERWKWUDQVFHQGHQWDOZKLFK,GRQ¶WEXW
OHW¶VVD\ZHGRWKHQ,KDYHWKHIHHOLQJWKDWSURFHGXUDOGHPRFUDWVKDYHVRPHWKLQJWRVD\DEout 
the outcome, that the outcome would be good if we respect the value of the procedure, which is 
equal liberty. And I wonder what epistemic democrats would say for the procedure, what is the 
YDOXHWKDWWKHSURFHGXUHVKRXOGXSKROGEHFDXVHWKHUH¶VWRRPXFh emphasis for epistemic 
democrats to have a best decision, a right decision, a true decision, whatever, and too little on 
what would be the way to reach them. I wonder, do you completely endorse the deliberative 
democratic kind of procedural ideas, or some others? And which would be the value by them? 
 
 Jim Fishkin from Stanford. I was struck by the comments about the question how much 
diversity does democracy require in values and attitudes as opposed to other considerations, I 
suppose. Now, as I recall fURP+pOqQH¶VERRNVKHVKDUHVZLWKPHWKHLGHDWKDWUDQGRPVDPSOLQJ
well done, should be a basis for deliberation and she then attributes epistemic virtues or claims to 
WKHUHVXOWV/HW¶VVHWWKHHSLVWHPLFSDUWDVLGHIRUDVHFRQGDQGVD\LI\RXWDNHDJRod random 
sample, adequate in size, you would have whatever diversity there is in attitudes as well as in 
demographics in the population, whatever diversity there is. Now as you say, rightly, at some 
SRLQWLIWKHUH¶VHQRXJKGLYHUVLW\HQRXJKFRQWHQWLRQVRme of the people may not subscribe to 
democracy at all and that could be a problem, a kind of what Dahl many years ago called severe 
asymmetric disagreement, you could have that. Nevertheless, you can have a representative 
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microcosm through sampling. Now that microcosm, its representativeness, to me, from my 
perspective, is very important since it supports a hypothetical inference about what the people 
would think about something under good conditions for thinking about it. Now, if you had a 
really perfect, actually existing democracy you would have everybody deliberating or thinking. 
7KHQWKHZKROHZLOORIWKHSHRSOHZRXOGQ¶WEHDK\SRWKHWLFDOLQIHUHQFHDERXWZKDWWKHSHRSOH
would think, it would be what the people really do think. But normally, the slam-bang 
competition of competitive bamboozling efforts²look at the circus we see unfolding before 
us²LVHQRXJKRIDGLVWUDFWLRQDQGLW¶VDVNLOOIXOZHOO-paid distraction, that the public has 
GLIILFXOW\GHWHUPLQLQJWKHWUXWKRIDQ\LVVXHWKDW¶VEHIRUHLWORRN at the immigration issues that 
are being debated now. So if you had the microcosm really deliberate under the best possible 
conditions, you would get a sort of Habermasian forceless force of the better argument. Maybe. 
Or that becomes, as Hélène said, an empirical question that we investigate empirically.  
 1RZ,¶YHDFWXDOO\SXVKHG+pOqQHRQWKHTXHVWLRQLIGLYHUVLW\LVVRJRRGHSLVWHPLFDOO\
maybe more diversity would be even better. But she has stuck with the same view that I have 
defended, which is, you want the diversity that is actually representative, you want a good 
UDQGRPVDPSOH\RXGRQ¶WZDQWWRJRHYHQIXUWKHU%XWWKDW¶VEHFDXVH,¶PLQWHUHVWHGLQWKH
inference about what the people would think if they were really thinking about it. Now whether 
WKDWLQIHUHQFHKDVHSLVWHPLFIRUFHZKHWKHULW¶VWKHEHVWGHFLVLRQLQVRPHVHQVH",WKLQNLWLVEXW
WKHQLW¶VDVRPHWLPHVFRQWHVWHGEHVWGHFLVLRQEHFDXVHWKHUH¶UHFRPSHWLQJYDOXHVWKHUHDUH
competing empirical claims about what might happen, you know every political viewpoint has 
WKHLURZQVHWRIH[SHUWVWKHLURZQHFRQRPLVWVWKHLURZQHFRQRPHWULFLDQPDJLFLDQVZKR¶GVD\
this would happen, that would happen, the battle of the magic asterisks, you know as Krugman 
says, so nobody really knows what would hapSHQ6RPD\EHWKHUH¶VDNLQGRIUDQJHRIWKH
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plausible, and deliberative democracy probably would yield a conclusion in the range of the 
plausible, which has one other merit, not really mentioned but I think you really allude to it, 
ZKLFKLVWKH³ZH-QHVV´ RILWWKHIDFWWKDWWKHSHRSOHFDQWDNHRZQHUVKLSRILWLW¶VQRWMXVW
somebody revises or corrects, we UHYLVHLW¶VGRQHZLWKDXWKRULW\LQWKHQDPHRIWKHSHRSOHWKH
people can say, this is something we believe in on balance when we think about it.  
 And so whether you want to call that an epistemic virtue, sometimes there may be a 
conflict between the best solution in terms of democracy or even the best solution in terms of the 
general welfare and the best solution in terms of justice or some other value, or equality, there 
may be other contested values that people will sincerely disagree about. But that itself is 
something that can be brought to a public arena, where people can really think about it. So I want 
to clarify, you want that amount of disagrHHPHQWDERXWYDOXHVWKDW¶VDFWXDOO\LQWKHSRSXODWLRQLI
you want the process to have external validity, if you want to make this inference about what the 
people would think rather than just some group of them. 
 
 Urbinati: Just a quick answer. I ask you a question: because the experimentation you 
perform is so fascinating and so important. My question is: are we the same citizens when we 
make an experimentation when there is nothing at stake there, when we have no interest there, 
and then a situation, when ZHKDYHWRJRWRYRWHDQGGLVFXVVQRWEHFDXVHZH¶UHH[SHULPHQWLQJ
the situation, but because we act as citizens? Do you think we act the same? I think the 
H[SHULPHQWDWLRQGRHVQ¶WWHOOXVEHFDXVHLW¶VDERXWLGHDOVXEMHFWFRQGLWLRQVEHFDXVHSHRSOHDUH
suSSRVHGWROLVWHQWRGLVFXVVWRH[FKDQJHWKH\KDYHQRWKLQJDWVWDNHVRWKH\FDQ¶WGHFLGH%XW
when we have many interests to carry on, when we go to vote, when we discuss, perhaps we are 
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no longer the same subject, so democracy is where in this case, here in the experimental moment 
or here in the practical moment.  
 
 Fishkin&DQ,DQVZHUTXLFNO\,NQRZ,¶PYLRODWLQJDOOWKHQRUPV6RZHLQFUHDVLQJO\
do our deliberative projects in contexts where voice matters, in some sort of policy-relevant 
context, often where the government is wrestling with some terrible problem, such as the 
-DSDQHVHQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRUHIRUPWKHLUSHQVLRQV\VWHPWKURXJK
SULYDWL]DWLRQRULQFUHDVLQJWD[HV2U7H[DVXWLOLWLHVZKHUHWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRJHWWKeir energy from, 
so we led them to increasing wind power in Texas, we led them to raise the taxes rather than 
SULYDWL]HLQ-DSDQDQG$IULFDQRZZH¶UHGRLQJLWZLWKSROLFLHVLQ8JDQGDDQG*KDQDDERXWZDWHU
VDQLWDWLRQKHDOWK$OORYHUWKHZRUOGZH¶UHGRLQJ it in contexts, so the trick is to get people to 
SD\DWWHQWLRQWRWKLQNWKHLUYRLFHPDWWHUV6R\RX¶UHULJKWWKHZRUNLQWHOHYLVLRQSURJUDPV
SHRSOHVD\,¶PRQWHOHYLVLRQP\YRLFHPDWWHUVWKDWZRUNHGEHWWHUWKDQSHRSOHWKRXJKW%XWWKH
problem is to overcome rational ignorance, one voice in million, but if you have one voice in 
fifteen and one way to sample 300 or 400, do you think your voice matters? Even better, in a 
policy context, if the policy makers are there on the panel, they see the results and they do 
actually follow through and implement the results, then you are actually more influential in the 
GHOLEHUDWLYHSROOWKDQ\RXDUHLQRQHYRWHLQDPLOOLRQLQDQDFWXDOHOHFWLRQ:HOOLW¶VMXVWWKH
condition of our society that as one voter in man\PLOOLRQV\RXNQRZ\RXGRQ¶WKDYHDORWRI
UDWLRQDOUHDVRQWRSD\DWWHQWLRQVR,WKLQN\RX¶UHULJKWLW¶VDUHDOO\IXQGDPHQWDOFKDOOHQJHWR
WKHVHH[SHULPHQWDWLRQVEXWLQFUHDVLQJO\ZH¶UHWU\LQJWRILQGFRQWH[WVZKHUHLW¶VSODXVLEOHWRVD\
to the people \RXUYRLFHZLOOPDWWHU,Q&KLQDZKHUHWKH\¶UHDFWXDOO\PDNLQJEXGJHWVLQORFDO
WRZQVZHMXVWGLGRQHLQDSDUWRI6KDQJKDLLQ:HQ/LQJLQYDULRXVSODFHVZKHUHWKH\GRQ¶W
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have party competition in democracy, but there are actually lots of people in local governments 
PDNLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHW<RXPLJKWVD\LW¶VQRWDGHPRFUDF\FHUWDLQO\&KLQD¶VQRWD
GHPRFUDF\LQJHQHUDOEXWLW¶VDYHU\LPSRUWDQWWKLQJZKDWDJRYHUQPHQWGRHVZLWKLWVPRQH\
DQGWKH\¶UHPDNLQJWKHLUEXGJHWVVRLW¶VDFWXDOO\PRUH democratic than local governments in any 
SODFH,¶YHOLYHG6RWKDWZRXOGEHP\DQVZHU 
 
 Paul Gunn, University of London. I want to just challenge many of the theorists on ways 
of talking about democracy. I think real-world democracy, broadly speaking, it¶VDSUREOHP-
solving mechanism. I think people largely approach it as a problem-solving mechanism. The 
UHDVRQLW¶VVRFRPSOLFDWHGQRZLVWKDWIRUGHFDGHVSHRSOHDSSURDFKHGLWDVDSUREOHP-solving 
mechanism. People have used their votes to solve problems, to express their preference for 
different candidates offering different solutions for how these problems might be solved. It may 
simply be the case that these problems are so complicated that the state has grown in response to 
them, grown to try to deal witKWKHP*RLQJEDFNWR+pOqQH¶VSRLQWWKDWWKLVLVQ¶WUHDOO\
democracy, I challenge that; it is democratic, people approach it in that way, the state is largely 
UHVSRQVLYHWRWKHLUYLHZV7KHGLIILFXOW\LVNQRZLQJKRZWRVROYHWKHVHSUREOHPVWKH\¶UHYHU\
G\QDPLFWKH\¶UHYHU\FRPSOLFDWHG 
 7KDWJRHVEDFNWRWKHGHOLEHUDWLYHGHPRFUDF\SRLQWWKHUH¶VDELJELJTXHVWLRQKHUH
which is, how would we know how to approach these questions, how do you know, even in an 
ideal democratic setting, how would we know what information to give the voters, how they 
VKRXOGGHOLEHUDWHDERXWLWDQGZKDWDJRRGRXWFRPHZRXOGORRNOLNH",WKLQNWKDW¶VWKHSUREOHP
ZHKDYHQRZ7KHSUREOHPGRHVQ¶WMXVWJRDZD\LIZHLGHDOL]HWKHGHPRFUDWLFFRQGLWLRQV 
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 /DQGHPRUH3DXORQWKHLGHDWKDWGHPRFUDF\LVDERXWVROYLQJSUREOHPVWKDWLW¶VYHU\
GLIILFXOWWRNQRZZKDWWKH\DUHPD\EH\RX¶UHULJKWEXW,ZRXOGMXVWSRLQWRXWWKDWZKHQ\RX
have a system where Congress has a 9 percent rate of approval, something abysmal like that, and 
KDVQ¶WEHHQKHUHVLQFHSHUFHQWVLQFHWKH¶VDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHWXUQRYHUUDWHLV
VRPHWKLQJOLNHSHUFHQWWRPHLW¶VDVWURQJVLJQDOWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDWWKHWRSLVQRW
inclusive enough. According to the liberal theorLHV,XVHLW¶VSUREDEO\QRWSHUIRUPLQJYHU\ZHOO
6RWKDW¶VRQHZD\WRJHWDWLW 
 Then the question of tradeoffs, Jim put it that way, how much diversity does democracy 
UHTXLUHRUWROHUDWH",WGHSHQGVZKDWNLQGRIGLYHUVLW\ZH¶UHWDONLQJDERXW,QWKHEook I 
distinguish, very simplistically I guess, between cognitive diversity and value diversity. I said, 
ORRNFRJQLWLYHGLYHUVLW\LVJUHDWDVIRUYDOXHGLYHUVLW\DVIDULW¶VDERXWIXQGDPHQWDOYDOXH
GLYHUVLW\LW¶VEDGEHFDXVHZH¶UHQRWHYHQWU\LQJWRVolve the same problem, so all the epistemic 
TXDOLWLHVJRRXWWKHZLQGRZ7KDW¶VEHFDXVH,¶PWU\LQJWRSXWWRJHWKHUDVLPSOHPRGHOLQWKH
ERRN%XWLQIDFWWKHWZRDUHQRWHDV\WRGLVVRFLDWHLW¶VOLNHO\WKDWWKH\¶UHFRUUHODWHGWKDW¶VZK\
we need Republicans because they just see the world differently. So value diversity is actually 
harming us in some way, but also enhancing it in some way, because they actually see 
GHPRFUDF\GLIIHUHQWO\$QGWKDW¶VZKHUH,WKLQN\RXQHHGWRVWDUWGRLQJ,¶PQRWVXUH,ZDQW to 
call it empirical, but push the model farther and inject some value diversity into the model and 
see how far it can go while retaining the epistemic properties, and maybe it would just hang by a 
WKUHDGDQGPD\EHWKDW¶VZK\ZKHQZHHOHFWVRPHERG\HOHFWed by 51 percent of the vote, you 
GRQ¶WJHWSHUFHQWEHFDXVHRIDOOWKHFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQYDOXHDQGFRJQLWLYHGLYHUVLW\EXWZHVWLOO
JHWHQRXJKRIDQHSLVWHPLFSHUIRUPDQFHWRPDNHWKHV\VWHPZRUNRYHUWLPH6RWKDW¶VD
distinction I wanted to make.  
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 And then the tradeoffs between epistemic considerations and others, when we vote, as I 
understood the question at least, yes, Daniel is absolutely right²DQGPD\EH,VKRXOG¶YHVDLGWKDW
again²my book is really about one slice of the case for democracy, the epiVWHPLFFDVH,¶PQRW
denying that there are procedural arguments for it that are very important and that we may have 
to face tradeoffs between procedural considerations and epistemic ones. I think when we vote we 
do both: we express a strong fundamental value preference for, say, equality over, maybe, a free 
market preference or something like that. At the same time we pass a judgment about what we 
WKLQNZRXOGZRUNEHVWIRUWKHFRXQWU\DWWKDWSRLQWLQWLPH6R,GRQ¶WUHDOO\KDYHDJRRGDQVZHU
about how you handle the tradeoff, I just acknowledge it. 
 
 9LHKRII,¶OOVD\YHU\TXLFNO\,WKLQNYDOXHGLYHUVLW\DQGHSLVWHPLFGLYHUVLW\DUHUHDOO\
LPSRUWDQWWKDW¶VMXVWWKHILQDOSRLQWWKDW+pOqQHWDONHGDERXWSDUWO\LQUHVSRQVHWR-LP%XW,
WKLQNLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWZRTXLWHGLIIHUHQWUHODWLRQV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHUH¶VWKH
question, whether value diversity affects epistemic diversity in a variety ways that might be 
EHQHILFLDO%XWLWVHHPVWRPHDPXFKGHHSHUTXHVWLRQLVLIWKHUH¶VYDOXHGLYHUVLW\Zhat is meant 
to be the normative significance of any decision we in fact reach. Here is one way to think about 
this: If you think of epistemic diversity, the logic of the Page-+RQJPRGHOLVWRVD\µ/RRNZH
might all disagree ex ante, but in the end we can actually agree on what the correct institutions 
are, because while we all have different cognitive endowments at different stages, we actually 
DJUHHRQWKHDFWXDOUDQNLQJRIWKHYDOXHV¶6RZHKDUQHVVHSLVWHPLFGLYHUVLW\WRXOWLPDWHO\
overcome our disagreement. And now the fundamental challenge to the model, and to the general 
ZD\RIWKLQNLQJDERXWGHPRFUDF\WKDWWKLVPRGHOVXJJHVWVDVNVµ:KDWKDSSHQVZKHQZHGRQ¶W
VKDUHWKHIUDPHZRUNIRUUDQNLQJVROXWLRQV"¶%XWWKHQHYHQLI\RXWKLQNWKDWFRJQLWLYHGLversity 
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FDQVRPHWLPHVEHEHQHILFLDO\RXRXJKWWRZRUU\WKDWVXFKGLYHUVLW\ZRQ¶WEHEHQHILFLDOZKHQLW
UXQVVRGHHSWKDWZHGRQ¶WHYHQVKDUHDUDQNLQJRIVROXWLRQV$QGWKDW¶VMXVWZKDWPXFKRIRXU
fundamental normative disagreement looks like. So if we want to solve the second problem of 
value diversity ± why to abide by democratic decisions with which we disagree ± we may have 
to refer to some quite different explanation. That explanation might appeal to the value of our 
ruling ourselves, or perhaps to tKHLPSRUWDQFHRISURFHGXUDOHTXDOLW\%XWLWZRQ¶WDSSHDOWR
epistemic considerations.  
 
 Fishkin: can I make a shameless announcement on behalf of Hélène Landemore? She will 
be given the Spitz prize for the best book for the year; the event place will take place here, Parc 
55. Given the value diversity in this room, we can continue the discussion on epistemic 
outcomes. 
 
 Landemore: Thank you. 
 
 Viehoff: Thank you all. 
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